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Comparative Productivity in British and 
German Manufacturing Before World 
War II: Reconciling Direct Benchmark 
Estimates and Time Series Projections 
?
STEPHEN BROADBERRY AND CARSTEN BURHOP
This article provides a new benchmark estimate of comparative Germany/U.K. 
labor productivity in manufacturing for circa 1907, and experiments with alter-
native German manufacturing production indices for time series projection from 
a circa 1935 benchmark. A consistent picture of broadly similar levels of manu-
facturing labor productivity in Britain and Germany throughout the period 
1871–1938 is established. We also show that a substantial German productivity 
lead had already emerged in heavy industry by 1907, but was offset by a sub-
stantial British productivity lead in light industry. For the pre-1914 period, an 
additional check is provided using nominal income-based estimates.  
ontroversy continues to surround the issue of Germany’s level of 
labor productivity in manufacturing compared with that of Britain 
before World War II. A long tradition going back at least as far as 
Ernest Williams has suggested that Britain was already falling behind 
Germany in manufacturing in the late nineteenth century, and this view 
was bolstered by the views of Alexander Gerschenkron and David Lan-
des, who saw Germany as modernizing before World War I on the basis 
of heavy industry.
1
 Worries about competition from Germany resur-
faced during the interwar period, which saw Germany reclaim its posi-
tion in export markets. Furthermore, this view of Germany leapfrogging 
ahead of Britain also underpins Alfred D. Chandler Jr.’s characteriza-
tion of German manufacturing as closer to the successful U.S. model of 
“managerial capitalism” than the supposedly failing British model of 
“personal capitalism.”
2
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 However, this traditional view has proved difficult to square with 
work in the historical national accounts (HNA) framework. In a series 
of studies working at the level of the aggregate economy, Angus Mad-
dison showed that GDP per hour worked and GDP per employee were 
substantially higher in Britain than in Germany before World War II, 
projecting with times series from a benchmark close to the present.
3
Furthermore, Rainer Fremdling pointed out that the sectoral data under-
pinning the Maddison results also show labor productivity in industry to 
have been substantially lower in Germany than in Britain before World 
War I.
4
 Fremdling’s study used data on nominal income in the commod-
ity-producing sectors of the two countries in particular years, converted 
at purchasing power parities (PPPs) derived from agricultural and in-
dustrial products. Strictly speaking, Fremdling’s results apply to a wide 
definition of industry, which includes construction and the utilities as 
well as manufacturing, but manufacturing was by far the biggest indus-
trial sector in both countries. Recognizing the disjuncture between this 
result and the traditional literature, Fremdling records his doubts about 
Germany having lower industrial productivity than Britain on the eve of 
World War I and speculates that it may reflect an under-estimation of 
capital income in Germany by Walther Hoffmann.
5
By projecting with the time series of Charles Feinstein and Hoffmann 
from a benchmark for circa 1935 produced by Broadberry and Fremdling, 
Broadberry then showed that labor productivity in manufacturing was 
slightly higher in Germany than in Britain in the pre–World War I pe-
riod.
6
 This work, which is perhaps best seen as taking an intermediate po-
sition between the traditional view of a large German superiority and the 
revisionist view of higher British productivity, has in turn been called 
into question by challenges to the Hoffmann index of industrial produc-
tion and to the original Broadberry and Fremdling benchmark for circa 
1935.
7
 Criticism of the Hoffmann industrial production index has come 
from Albrecht Ritschl and Burhop and Guntram Wolff, while doubt has 
been cast on the Broadberry/Fremdling benchmark by Fremdling and 
Reiner Stäglin’s discovery of deliberate falsification of the records by of-
ficials to conceal the production of munitions by the Nazi regime.
8
3 Maddison, Phases, Dynamic Forces, Monitoring, and World Economy.
4 Fremdling, “Productivity Comparison.” 
5 Ibid., pp. 39–42; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
6 Feinstein, National Income; Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; Broadberry and Fremdling, “Com-
parative Productivity”; and Broadberry, “Manufacturing.” 
7 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; and Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity.” 
8 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; Ritschl, “Spurious Growth”; Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise 
Estimate”; Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity”; and Fremdling and Stäglin, 
“Die Industrieerhebung.” 
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 It would therefore be very helpful to have a benchmark estimate of 
the comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity level in manufactur-
ing for the pre–World War I period that is entirely independent of the 
HNA time series data. The first objective of this article is to provide 
such an estimate, based on the British industrial census for 1907 and of-
ficial German data for a number of industries in 1907/08. As well as es-
tablishing more firmly the aggregate picture of broadly equal labor pro-
ductivity in the pre–World War I period, this new benchmark provides 
for the first time disaggregated estimates of comparative labor produc-
tivity in different branches of industry for the pre–World War I period. 
The sectoral picture suggests that a substantial German labor productiv-
ity lead in heavy industry (chemicals, metals) was offset by a substantial 
British labor productivity lead in light industry (textiles and food, drink 
and tobacco). In addition, Britain had a labor productivity advantage in 
mining, an important nonmanufacturing industry.  
A second objective is to experiment with alternative indices of German 
manufacturing output, to check for the consistency between time series 
projections and direct benchmark estimates. The two benchmarks for 
circa 1907 and circa 1935 are broadly consistent with the time series pro-
jections based on the Hoffmann index for Germany. A new series of Bur-
hop and Wolff for the pre–World War I era can be incorporated in a way 
that is consistent with the two benchmarks, but suggests a somewhat lar-
ger German labor productivity lead between the 1870s and the 1890s than 
suggested by the Hoffmann series.
9
 A problem of inconsistency arises 
only in the case of Ritschl’s new index of German industrial production 
for the interwar period, which incorporates a very major change to the 
output of the metal-working sector for the years 1925–1938.
10
 A third objective is to rework Fremdling’s income-based estimates of 
comparative Germany/U.K. industrial labor productivity, based on 
nominal net income per employee in British and German industry, con-
verted at PPPs for agricultural and industrial products and converted at 
market rates.
11
 We incorporate Burhop and Wolff’s allowance for 
Hoffmann’s underestimation of capital income in the pre-1914 period, 
restrict our attention to manufacturing and apply PPPs based only on 
manufactured products to these new data.
12
 We find broadly equal lev-
els of manufacturing labor productivity in the two countries throughout 
the period 1875–1913, as suggested by the output-based estimates. 
Overall, then, we are able to reconcile most of the existing time series 
9 Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate”; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
10 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” 
11 Fremdling, “Productivity Comparison.” 
12 Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate”; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
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and benchmark estimates of comparative Germany/U.K. labor produc-
tivity in manufacturing before World War II. 
A BENCHMARK FOR CIRCA 1907 
Data Sources 
 Although there was no full industrial census for Germany before 
World War I, much high quality information was collected. Some of 
this information was published in the form of a complete employment 
census for 1907, while for a number of industries, further information 
on the quantity and value of output and material inputs appeared in 
various sources. The Imperial Office of the Interior (Reichsamt des In-
neren) started industry surveys regarding output (value and volume), in-
put (value and volume), employment, and wages for some industries al-
ready in 1897. After the turn of the century, such surveys were 
conducted several times and for some industries on an annual basis. The 
findings were finally published by the Imperial Statistical Office.
13
 Fur-
thermore, production taxes for beer, sugar, and tobacco were levied in 
Germany, making collection of output data necessary. These output data 
were published annually by the Imperial Statistical Office and could be 
matched with employment data from the 1907 employment census.  
In contrast to the British census of production, Germany’s statistical 
office did not strictly apply the concept of value added. The modern na-
tional accounting standards use the term “gross value added” as the value 
of output less the value of intermediate goods consumed in the produc-
tion process. The British census of 1907 used the term net output instead 
of gross value added. The German term Nettoproduktionswert basically 
corresponds to the modern concept of gross value added, but because the 
Imperial Office of the Interior did not collect comprehensive data on in-
termediate goods consumed, this measure is likely to be biased.
14
 Nevertheless, this industrial census is a very useful source, covering 
nearly all firms in the surveyed industries. All firms listed by trade as-
sociations (Berufsgenossenschaften) were asked to submit anonymously 
information about the type of business, the number of establishments, 
the number of employees, the wage bill, the volume and value of inter-
mediate goods consumed, and the volume and value of production and 
of goods sold.
15
 Inputs were valued inclusive of transportation costs to 
13 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse”; and “Die Ergebnisse.” 
14 Tooze, Statistics, pp. 56–57. 
15 All employees of the firms listed by the Berufsgenossenschaften were counted for the in-
dustrial census, not only the insured employees. 
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the factory, whereas outputs were valued at factory gate prices (without 
transport costs). However, for all industries, no information was col-
lected on several items of intermediate consumption. In particular, the 
costs of maintenance of machinery and buildings, heating and power 
generation, packaging and overheads are not included in the German 
data throughout. Therefore, comparing German Nettoproduktionswerte
with British net output might overstate German labor productivity. The 
German census data are also less comprehensive in terms of industries 
covered than the British data. Whereas the British data cover total 
manufacturing, the German data focus on selected industries (see Ap-
pendix 1 for details). Furthermore, we can only use German and British 
data if we find the same information for the same industries in both cen-
suses. The German data included in our 1907 benchmark cover more 
than 1.7 million employees, slightly more than 29 percent of Germany’s 
total manufacturing employment in that year. The British data used for 
our benchmark include circa 1.56 million employees, about 27 percent 
of total manufacturing employment.  
 In our judgment, these sources are sufficient to allow us to make rea-
sonably reliable estimates of physical output per worker in Germany in 
1907/08, along the lines of those produced for 1935/36 by Laszlo  
Rostas and reworked by Broadberry and Fremdling.
16
 These estimates 
can then be compared with estimates of physical output per worker in 
the United Kingdom, derived from the First Census of Production for 




 Although it is possible to estimate net output for some German indus-
tries, we do not have sufficient information to do this reliably for the 
whole manufacturing sector. Hence for Germany, we are forced to rely 
on employment weights, shown here in Table 1. For the United King-
dom, we have both employment and net output weights, which are also 
shown in Table 1. We shall see, using U.K. data, that the choice of net 
output or employment weights makes little difference, so that the lack 
of German net output weights is unlikely to be too serious a problem. 
 The structure of industry was quite different in the two countries, 
with German manufacturing more oriented towards heavy industry, par-
ticularly metal production, and British manufacturing more oriented 
16 Rostas, Comparative Productivity; and Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Produc-
tivity.” 
17 Board of Trade, Final Report.
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TABLE 1












 General chemicals  0.18  0.92  0.88 
 Coke  0.82  0.08  0.12 
CHEMICALS & ALLIED  3.27  2.44  4.47 
 Iron & steel  0.78  0.72  0.72 
 Nonferrous metals  0.20  0.19  0.19 
 Motor vehicles  0.02  0.09  0.09 
METALS & ENGINEERING  39.33  29.08  30.01 
 Cotton  0.72  0.83  0.81 
 Silk  0.18  0.05  0.03 
 Leather  0.10  0.12  0.16 
TEXTILES & CLOTHING  22.49  36.82  27.40 
 Brewing  0.50  0.66  0.81 
 Tobacco  0.28  0.29  0.12 
 Sugar  0.22  0.05  0.07 
FOOD, DRINK, & TOBACCO  21.53  8.15  16.29 
 Cement  1.00  1.00  1.00 
OTHER MANUFACTURING  13.38  23.50  21.83 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING  100.00  100.00  100.00 
B. Industry 
MANUFACTURING  90.26  85.63  82.51 
 Salt mining  0.04  0.01  0.01 
 Coal mining  0.83  0.97  0.97 
 Iron ore mining  0.13  0.02  0.02 
MINING 9.74 14.37 17.49
TOTAL INDUSTRY  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Board of Trade, Final Report; and Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Berufs- und Be-
triebszählung.”
towards light industry, particularly textiles and clothing. However, note 
that although Britain had quite a large share of net output in food, drink, 
and tobacco, this accounted for a smaller share of employment, because 
of high net output per worker. Britain also had a substantially larger 
share of the labor force in mining than did Germany. 
 The weighting scheme in Table 1 is derived in the following way. 
First, employment (and also net output for Britain) was allocated across 
major sectors (indicated in upper case letters) from census sources.
18
Second, within major sectors, shares were allocated in proportion to the 
sectors for which we were able to make matches. For example, focusing 
on German employment weights, the major sector Chemicals & Allied 
Industries accounted for 188,073 employees out of a total of 5,758,891 
18 Ibid.; and Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Berufs- und Betriebszählung.” 
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TABLE 2
COMPARATIVE GERMANY/UNITED KINGDOM LABOR PRODUCTIVITY CIRCA 1907 
(United Kingdom = 100) 
  Germany/United Kingdom
 General chemicals  126.6
 Coke 98.9
CHEMICALS & ALLIED  113.9
 Iron & steel 137.8
 Nonferrous metals  157.9
 Motor vehicles 89.7








FOOD, DRINK, & TOBACCO  66.9 
 Cement 108.1
OTHER MANUFACTURING  108.1
TOTAL MANUFACTURING  105.0
 Salt mining 57.8
 Coal mining 78.5
 Iron ore mining 91.0
MINING 78.7 
TOTAL INDUSTRY 101.8
Source: See Appendix 1. 
in manufacturing, or 3.27 percent. Within this major sector, we were 
able to match data on two industries, general chemicals and coke. The 
general chemicals firms surveyed employed 4,578 persons, whereas in 
coke production 20,504 persons were employed in the surveyed firms. 
Total employment in the surveyed firms was thus 25,082, resulting in 
an employment weight of 82 percent for coke and 18 percent for general 
chemicals. Part A of Table 1 provides the weights within manufactur-
ing, and part B provides the weights for industry including mining. 
Results
 The individual industry results reported in Table 2 are based mainly 
on comparisons of physical output per worker in the two countries, with 
a value above 100 indicating a German productivity advantage and a 
value below 100 indicating a British productivity advantage. The single 
figure for each sector is arrived at by taking the geometric mean of re-
sults using German and British employment weights. The figure for to-
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tal manufacturing is 105.0, which is the geometric mean of 105.5 using 
German employment weights and 104.6 using British employment 
weights. Note that using British net output weights makes no real dif-
ference, yielding a comparative productivity ratio of 104.5. For total in-
dustry the geometric mean of 101.8 is derived from 102.9 using German 
employment weights and 100.8 using British employment weights, 
whereas the use of British net output weights yields a figure of 100.0. 
One might argue that these comparative labor productivity measures 
are biased because the British data are for 1907 throughout, whereas 
German data are for 1907 (motor vehicles, cotton, silk, brewing, tobacco, 
sugar), 1908 (chemicals, coke, iron & steel, nonferrous metals, mining), 
and 1910 (leather, cement) respectively. Taking employment weights, 28 
percent of the German data are for 1907, 68 percent for 1908, and 4 per-
cent for 1910. Between 1907 and 1908 (1910) labor productivity in-
creased faster in Germany than in Britain, thus our benchmark might 
overstate German productivity leadership. If projections are based on 
Hoffmann’s classic figures, comparative labor productivity improved in 
favor of Germany between 1907 and 1908 (1910) by 8.2 percent (14.7 
percent).
19
 Weighting this productivity increase by the employment 
shares for the different years yields a possible overestimation of Ger-
many’s productivity lead of 6.2 percent. Reducing our comparative labor 
productivity estimate by this leads to comparative labor productivity in 
manufacturing for 1907 of 98.9. Thus, even accounting for different years 
of census data did not change the basic results of a roughly equal labor 
productivity in manufacturing before World War I. 
Just as important as the results for total manufacturing and total indus-
try is the distribution of comparative productivity ratios across major sec-
tors. The key finding here is that Germany had higher labor productivity 
in heavy manufacturing, particularly in ferrous and nonferrous metals, 
but also in chemicals, while Britain had higher productivity in light 
manufacturing, particularly textiles and clothing and food, drink, and to-
bacco. Britain also had a productivity advantage at this time in mining. 
TIME SERIES PROJECTION, 1871–1938 
Methodological Considerations 
 Benchmarks are available only for a small number of years. To build 
up a full picture of the evolution of comparative productivity over time, 
it is necessary to use time series to project forwards and backwards. 
19 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
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However, this inevitably raises potential index number problems be-
cause of variation in the weighting schemes used in the output time se-
ries for the two countries, and differences in the proportion of output 
covered between the two benchmarks for each country. This has led to 
some controversy since the work of the Income Comparisons Project 
(ICP) for the post-1950 period, with H. Krijnse Locker and M. D.  
Faerber providing an early statement of the problem.
20
 Having initially provided a set of benchmarks that conflicted with 
time series projections, Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten 
have acknowledged that this is unsatisfactory in the following terms: 
If per capita G.D.P. in India relative to Korea is 40% in a 1970 benchmark and 
35% in a 1975 benchmark, then one inference is that the growth rate per capita 
in Korea must have been about 5% more than in India between 1970 and 1975. 
Often such an implied result is not consistent with the national growth rates in 
the two countries, posing a problem to users. 21
One solution offered by Summers and Heston to the problem of incon-
sistency between benchmarks and time series projections was to change 
the national growth rates as well as the benchmarks, in a process known 
as “consistentization.”
22
 However, Heston, Summers, and Aten have 
now acknowledged that it is difficult to persuade people of the need to 
change widely accepted growth rates to fit in with benchmark estimates:  
It was hard to sell the idea of modifying country growth rates to countries, inter-
national organizations and to men or women of affairs. Therefore in our recent 
uses of consistentization we have not modified country growth rates, but only 
the different benchmark estimates.23
 The methodology adopted by Broadberry has been to recognize the 
need to tell a coherent story, but at the same time, to acknowledge the 
inevitability of some disagreement between constant price time series 
projections and current price benchmark estimates.
24
 If a projection is 
made from a single benchmark, other benchmarks can be used to pro-
vide a cross-check on the projection, with Broadberry suggesting that a 
reasonable aim should be to keep disagreements between direct bench-
marks and time series projections to within 10 percent.
25
20 Krijnse Locker and Faerber, “Space and Time.” 
21 Heston, Summers and Aten, “Price Structures,” p. 2. 
22 Summers and Heston, “New Set.” 
23 Heston, Summers and Aten, “Price Structures,” p. 6. 
24 Broadberry, “Manufacturing,” “How Did the United States?” and “Relative Per Capita In-
come”; Krijnse Locker and Faerber, “Space and Time”; Nuxoll, “Differences”; and Dowrick 
and Akmal, “Contradictory Trends.” 
25 Broadberry, “Manufacturing.” 
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 Applying this to the case of the United States and the United King-
dom during the period 1870–1990, Broadberry was critical of Marianne 
Ward and John Devereux’s claim, on the basis of a new benchmark, that 
U.S. per capita income in 1872 was 18 percent higher than in the United 
Kingdom, compared with Maddison’s result, based on time series pro-
jection, that the United States was at 78 percent of the U.K. level, a dis-
crepancy of 40 percentage points, or more than 50 percent of the Mad-
dison estimate.
26
 Broadberry’s case was strengthened by the provision 
of additional economy-wide benchmarks for 1910, 1937, and 1950, plus 
reconciliation of benchmarks and time series projections at the level of 
ten subsectors, at the previously mentioned dates plus additional bench-
marks for the majority of sectors at 1924, 1930, 1968, and 1990.
27
 In 
most cases, benchmarks fell within 10 percent of the time series projec-
tions. Given the widespread acceptance of the time series produced by 
Feinstein and by John Kendrick, together with the coherence between 
these times series and the benchmarks, there must be a strong presump-
tion in favor of the Maddison estimates.
28
 We now consider the recon-
ciliation of time series projections and direct benchmarks in the case of 
German and British manufacturing industry.  
Choice of Benchmark 
 The first issue that must be decided is the choice of benchmark on 
which to base the time series projections. As we have constructed a new 
benchmark for 1907, this obviously provides one option for the base. 
However, we could alternatively use either the Broadberry and Frem-
dling benchmark for 1935 or the Fremdling, Herman de Jong and Mar-
cel Timmer benchmark for 1935/36.
29
 The latter draws on the findings 
of Fremdling and Stäglin, that the published 1936 census was distorted 
for military-strategic purposes.
30
 Fremdling and Stäglin recalculate the 
input-output table for 1936, using archival records. This leads to differ-
ent estimates of net output and employment in individual branches of 
industry, although the effects on industry as a whole are quite small. We 
have opted for the 1935 benchmark of Broadberry and Fremdling for 
26 Broadberry, “Relative Per Capita Income”; Ward and Devereux, “Measuring British De-
cline”; and Maddison, Monitoring.
27 Broadberry, “How Did the United States?” 
28 Feinstein, National Income; Kendrick, Productivity Trends; and Maddison, Monitoring.
29 Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity”; and Fremdling, de Jong and 
Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing.” 
30 Fremdling and Stäglin, “Die Industrieerhebung” and “Eine Input-Output-Tabelle”; and 
Reichsamt für wehrwirtschaftliche Planung, Die deutsche Industrie.
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TABLE 3
COMPARATIVE GERMANY/UNITED KINGDOM LABOR PRODUCTIVITY,  
CIRCA 1935 
(United Kingdom = 100) 
A. Broadberry and Fremdling 
  Germany/United Kingdom
Chemicals & allied  123  
Metal production  116  
Engineering  120  
Textiles & clothing  97  
Food, drink, & tobacco  41  
Other manufacturing  102  
Total manufacturing  102  
B. Fremdling, de Jong and Timmer 
  Germany/United Kingdom
  Single-Deflated  Double-Deflated 
Chemicals 111  126 
Iron & steel  134  175
Nonferrous metals  133  104
Engineering 112  106 
Textiles 97  76 
Leather 73  47 
Clothing 94  93 
Food 69  78 
Building materials  98  106
Paper 103  141 
Timber 151  90 
Miscellaneous 100  95 
Total manufacturing  105  107
Sources: Derived from Broadbery and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity”; and Fremdling, 
de Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing.” 
the following reasons.
31
 First, there is much less information available 
for 1907 than for 1935/36, so a later benchmark is likely to be more re-
liable. Second, the Broadberry and Fremdling benchmark is on the same 
conceptual basis as the 1907 benchmark presented in this article, work-
ing in terms of quantity indicators rather than nominal net output com-
pared using industry-specific price ratios.
 A comparison between the Broadberry and Fremdling and the Frem-
dling, de Jong, and Timmer benchmarks for circa 1935 is provided in 
parts A and B of Table 3. Reassuringly, there is a strong measure of 
agreement amongst the different benchmarks, despite the conceptual 
differences and the distortions introduced by military planners. First, 
note the narrow range for the total manufacturing comparative produc-
31 Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity.” 
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tivity ratio in the different studies, with Fremdling, de Jong, and 
Timmer arriving at a ratio of 105 or 107, compared with the Broadberry 
and Fremdling ratio of 102.
32
 These differences are well within the 10 
percent bounds suggested by Broadberry for this type of work.
33
 Sec-
ond, note that if we compare the pattern of comparative productivity 
performance across sectors in 1935 from Table 3 with the pattern for 
1907 in Table 2, there is a high degree of persistence. Germany had a 
labor productivity lead in heavy industries such as chemicals and metals 
in both years, while Britain had a persistent labor productivity lead in 
light industries such as textiles and clothing, and food, drink, and to-
bacco. Third, note that this pattern of stronger German productivity per-
formance in heavy industry and better British productivity performance 
in light industry is as clear in the Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer 
benchmark as it is in the Broadberry and Fremdling benchmark.
34
Revisions to the German Time Series Data 
 The British historical national accounts for this period are uncontro-
versial and we employ Feinstein’s index of production for manufactur-
ing, as in Broadberry’s previous work.
35
 Employment data for Britain 
are also derived from Feinstein, but with some interpolation for the pre-
1920 period, using the cyclical pattern in Feinstein’s total employment 
series.
36
 Germany’s historical national accounts are rather more contro-
versial, however. A widely used industrial production index was calcu-
lated by Hoffmann.
37
 This index is based mainly on physical output se-
ries for 12 industries, but includes construction and the utilities as well 
as manufacturing. To be comparable with Feinstein’s index for Britain, 
Hoffmann’s index of total industrial production thus needs to be recal-
culated to cover only manufacturing, as in Broadberry’s earlier work.
38
 Hoffmann’s industrial production index was calculated from time se-
ries of physical output for 11 industries and a labor income series for 
one industry (metal processing).
39
 These 12 series were aggregated into 
a comprehensive industrial production index using net output weights. 
However, because reliable estimates of industrial net output for Ger-
32 Fremdling, de Jong and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing”; and Broadberry 
and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity.” 
33 Broadberry, “Manufacturing.” 
34 Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing”; and Broadberry 
and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity.” 
35 Feinstein, National Income; and Broadberry, Productivity Race.
36 Feinstein, National Income.
37 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
38 Feinstein, National Income; Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; and Broadberry, “Manufacturing.” 
39 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum, pp. 344–95. 
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many are available only for 1936, Hoffmann came up with a procedure 
to create proxy net output weights for earlier years.
40
 For each industry, 
this involved taking net output per employee in 1936 and multiplying it 
by employment in the same industry in 1882, 1907, and 1933. The 
product of 1936 labor productivity and 1882 (1907, 1933) employment 
then gives the weight of each industry for the years 1871–1895 (1895–
1913, 1925–1938). Because we are interested in manufacturing, we will 
work with the ten industries excluding construction and the utilities. 
 We will report first the results of time series projection using the 
Hoffmann industrial production index recalculated on to a manufactur-
ing-only basis by Broadberry.
41
 We will then construct two alternative 
projections to take account of recent criticisms of the Hoffmann index.
42
 One of the most important output series used by Hoffmann has been 
criticized recently. Ritschl presents a new time series for metal process-
ing, the most important branch of German industry, for the years 1913 
and 1925–1938, which suggests that the level of output in the interwar 
period was much lower relative to the prewar period than in the  
Hoffmann series.
43
 Ritschl believes that the Hoffmann index fails to re-
flect a substantial shift in the distribution of income in favor of labor, 
which occurred across World War I. Because the production index for 
metal processing is calculated by dividing labor income by a constant 
labor income share, the hypothesis of a nonconstant labor income share 
in metal processing is quite important.
44
 As we shall see later, however, 
Burhop and Wolff’s income-based estimates suggest the alternative 
possibility that Hoffmann underestimated the pre–World War I level of 
capital income.
45
 A further criticism of the time series used by  
Hoffmann is made by Burhop and Wolff, who derive a new index for 
industrial output for the years 1851 to 1913 based on re-estimated in-
dustrial income data.
46
 Two indices of manufacturing output in Germany between 1871 and 
1938 are plotted in Figure 1. First, there is the original Hoffmann indus-
trial production index adjusted on to a manufacturing-only basis by 
Broadberry.
47
 Second, there is an index including Ritschl’s correction 
40 Ibid., pp. 389–95. 
41 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; and Broadberry, Productivity Race.
42 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
43 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth”; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
44 It is not clear how Ritschl treats the territorial losses of Germany after World War I. Terri-
tories covering about 35 percent of German 1913 steel output were lost after the War. Ritschl 
fixes output of metal processing industry to 1913 = 100, but it is not clear if he uses 1913 terri-
tory or 1921 territory to do this. 
45 Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate.” 
46 Ibid. 
47 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; and Broadberry, Productivity Race.
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FIGURE 1
INDICES OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION IN GERMANY 
Sources: Broadberry, Productivity Race, pp. 42–44, based on Hoffmann, Das Wachstum;
Ritschl, “Spurious Growth,” p. 216, col. 4; and Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate,” 
pp. 652–53. Industrial production indices are adjusted for the weight of utilities and construction 
according to Hoffmann, Das Wachstum, pp. 390–95, cols. 11 and 12. 
for the interwar period, as well as Burhop and Wolff’s correction for the 
prewar period.
48
 For the prewar period, the Burhop and Wolff index is 
slightly above the level displayed by Hoffmann’s original data, espe-
cially for the 1870s to 1890s.
49
 Large differences can be noted between 
Hoffmann’s original data and the manufacturing output index based on 
Ritschl’s modification. Generally, Ritschl’s index is well below the 
level displayed by Hoffmann’s original data.
50
Results
 Figure 2 displays the time series projection from the 1935 Broad-
berry/Fremdling benchmark estimate for comparative Germany/U.K. 
48 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth”; and Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate.” 
49 Ibid.; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
50 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth”; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
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FIGURE 2
COMPARATIVE GERMANY/UNITED KINGDOM LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN 
MANUFACTURING, 1871–1938 
(United Kingdom = 100) 
Sources: U.K. output: Broadberry, Productivity Race, pp. 42–44, based on Feinstein, National
Income; U.K. employment: Broadberry, Productivity Race, pp. 42–44, based on Feinstein, Na-
tional Income; German output: Broadberry, Productivity Race, pp. 42–44, based on Hoffmann, 
Das Wachstum; Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate”; and Ritschl, “Spurious Growth,” 
p. 216, col. 4; German employment: Broadberry, Productivity Race, pp. 42–44, based on  
Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
labor productivity in manufacturing.
51
 The first projection, labeled 
Broadberry, uses the Hoffmann index of German manufacturing out-
put.
52
 Note first that the projected values for 1907 and 1908 are 107.8 
and 116.7 respectively, reassuringly close to our circa 1907 benchmark 
value of 105.0. If, alternatively, the 1907 benchmark is used as the basis 
of the projections, this gives projected values for 1935 and 1936 of 
100.5 and 99.3, respectively. This is again reassuringly close to all the 
circa 1935 benchmarks ranging from 102 to 107. 
 The second projection in Figure 2, labeled “Burhop-Wolff-
Hoffmann,” uses Burhop and Wolff’s data for the prewar period and 
51 Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity.” 
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Hoffmann’s data for the interwar period.
53
 This results in a similar pic-
ture to the Broadberry estimate for the period from the turn of the cen-
tury to 1938. However, between the 1870s and the 1890s, this series 
suggests that German labor productivity was already ahead of the Brit-
ish level, although the difference is not that great. Reconciliation of this 
time series finding with cross-sectional evidence would require a new 
benchmark for the 1870s. With the data available at the moment, that 
does not seem feasible, so this must remain an open issue. 
 Finally, we calculated an index using Burhop and Wolff’s data for the 
prewar period and Ritschl’s data for the interwar period.
54
 Using this 
time series to extrapolate from the 1935 benchmark backwards to the 
1907 benchmark in Figure 2 leads to a German labor productivity lead 
over Britain of more than 50 percent in 1907–1908, about 40 percentage 
points above the 1907 benchmark estimate, and a rather unlikely find-
ing. It thus seems that Ritschl’s modifications to Hoffmann’s index of 
industrial production need further adjustment.
55
INCOME BASED ESTIMATES 
 We can compare these findings based on output data with alternative 
estimates of comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity in manufac-
turing based on income data. This is important because Fremdling 
found labor productivity in German industry to vary between around 
half to two-thirds of the British level between the 1870s and World 
War I, which appears to conflict strongly with our findings of broadly 
equal labor productivity.
56
 The most important adjustment follows from 
the use of Burhop and Wolff’s allowance for Hoffmann’s under-
estimation of capital income in the pre-1914 period.
57
 This was noted by 
Fremdling, who argued that Hoffmann assumed far too low a rate of re-
turn on capital, but Fremdling did not produce an alternative estimate.
58
The second adjustment arises from the fact that our estimates are re-
stricted to manufacturing, although this makes only a small difference. 
The third adjustment arises from the fact that Fremdling used PPPs for 
commodity output, including agricultural as well as industrial com-
modities. We calculate the PPPs solely on the basis of manufactured 
products, which makes a big difference because protection in Germany 
ensured that the price of agricultural products did not fall in line with 
53 Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate”; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
54 Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate”; and Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” 
55 Ibid.; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
56 Fremdling, “Productivity Comparison.” 
57 Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate”; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
58 Fremdling, “German National Accounts”; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
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TABLE 4
INCOME BASED ESTIMATES OF COMPARATIVE GERMANY/UNITED KINGDOM 



















Worker at PPP 






1875–1884  1,428  22.3 64.0 69.3 92.4 101.0 
1885–1894  1,484  23.0 64.5 72.9 88.5 99.7
1895–1904  1,679  23.7 70.8 84.6 83.7 97.3
1905–1913  2,159  23.2 93.7 96.1 97.5 110.1 
Sources: German net output per worker from Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate”; U.K. 
net output per worker derived from Feinstein, National Income; Average PPP derived from 
Fremdling, “Productivity Comparison,” using only manufactured products. 
agricultural prices in Britain, where markets remained open to cheap 
grain and meat from the New World.
59
 But even here, it is worth noting 
that the particular industrial products for which Fremdling was able to 
obtain data are biased towards finding a higher price level in Ger-
many.
60
 Fremdling provides series for the prices of pig iron, cotton 
yarn, and flour to represent the metals, textiles, and food sectors, re-
spectively.
61
 However, Germany imported pig iron from Britain to 
make steel that was competitive on world markets, and also imported 
cotton yarn from Britain to produce cotton cloth that was competitive 
on world markets. Also, the principal ingredient of flour was grain, the 
price of which was kept artificially high in Germany through agricul-
tural protection. 
 In Table 4, we derive British net output per employee from informa-
tion in the historical national accounts combined with the 1907 Census 
of Production. This involves using Feinstein’s time series of NNP from 
the income side to project the value of net output in manufacturing from 
the 1907 Census, and the time series of employment in manufacturing 
from Broadberry to project the 1911 manufacturing labor figure from 
Feinstein.
62
 The assumption of a constant share of manufacturing in cur-
rent price national income is consistent with the figures of Phyllis 
Deane and William Cole.
63
 For Germany, the 1907 share of manufactur-
ing output in total industrial output is calculated using the weights given 
by Hoffmann.
64
 This is then multiplied with the 1913 total industrial 
59 In addition, some heavy industrial products were also protected by import duties. 
60 Fremdling, “Productivity Comparison.” 
61 Ibid., p. 30. 
62 Feinstein, National Income, table 1; Broadberry, Productivity Race, p. 43; and Feinstein, 
National Income, table 60. 
63 Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth, p. 166. 
64 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum, p. 390. 
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output from Burhop and Wolff to yield an estimate of manufacturing 
net output that is substantially higher than that implicit in Hoffman’s in-
come side data.
65
 This yields a 1913 manufacturing labor productivity 
of M 2,413. The income-based 1913 benchmark for Germany is pro-
jected backwards using the nominal NNP data together with the as-
sumption of a constant share of manufacturing in Germany. Combined 
with data on manufacturing employment, this yields an income-based 
estimate of manufacturing labor productivity. These data series for the 
two countries can be compared using market exchange rates or PPPs, as 
in Table 4.
 The whole period is divided into four sub-periods, 1875–1884, 1885–
1894, 1895–1904, and 1905–1913. The average PPPs for manufactured 
products move more closely in line with the exchange rate than Frem-
dling’s PPPs for a wider range of commodities, which were heavily in-
fluenced by protected agricultural products.
66
 Using these PPPs, Ger-
man manufacturing output per worker was slightly below British labor 
productivity throughout the period. However, using the market ex-
change rate instead of PPPs, labor productivity was slightly higher in 
Germany. The PPPs most likely understate true German productivity, 
for the reasons outlined previously, while the market exchange rate 
probably overstates German productivity. Taken together, the two 
measures suggest broadly equal labor productivity in German and Brit-
ish manufacturing before World War I. Correcting the Hoffmann in-
come data for underestimation of capital income therefore removes a 




 Labor productivity in manufacturing was about the same in Germany 
and Britain from the late nineteenth century to World War II, supporting 
the earlier findings of Broadberry.
68
 Benchmark estimates for 1907 and 
1935 show Germany ahead in heavy industry (chemicals, metals), 
whereas Britain had higher productivity in the light industries, espe-
65 Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate,” p. 642; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
66 Fremdling, “Productivity Comparison,” p. 33. 
67 Engel, “Die erwerbstätingen juristischen Personen,” p. 468, gives some support to our hy-
pothesis of an equal manufacturing labor productivity in Britain and Germany around 1880. Ac-
cording to our extrapolation, nominal manufacturing labor productivity was 1,428 M between 
1875 and 1884. Engel estimates a gross manufacturing output per worker of 3,600 M for the 
early 1870s. A reasonable assumption is that net output per worker (labor productivity) is about 
40 percent of gross output, or 1,440 Marks, a figure quite close to our extrapolation. 
68 Broadberry, Productivity Race.
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cially in textiles, and food, drink, and tobacco. Our new 1907 bench-
mark estimate thus offers qualified support to the traditional view of 
Williams, Gerschenkron, and Landes, who saw Germany as moderniz-
ing before World War I on the basis of heavy industry.
69
 However, it 
also encompasses the newer historical national accounting viewpoint, 
which notes that the high-productivity modernized parts of the German 
economy co-existed with low-productivity traditional parts, so that 
whole-economy productivity was substantially higher in Britain than in 
Germany. 
 Starting from Broadberry and Fremdling’s 1935 benchmark estimate 
of comparative labor productivity in manufacturing, we project back-
wards to 1871 and forwards to 1938 using new time series data of Ger-
many’s manufacturing output.
70
 The two benchmark estimates are 
broadly consistent with the Hoffmann  and Burhop and Wolff indices of 
industrial output.
71
 However, Burhop and Wolff’s industrial output data 
suggest a German labor productivity lead in manufacturing already dur-
ing the 1870s. Future research should check this hypothesis with a new 
benchmark estimate. So far, however, the available data are not suffi-
cient to calculate such an early benchmark estimate. 
 We support our finding for the pre–World War I period using new in-
come data from Burhop and Wolff.
72
 Using these data, we rework 
Fremdling’s income-based estimate of comparative labor productivity 
in manufacturing.
73
 We find broadly equal levels of manufacturing la-
bor productivity in the two countries throughout the period 1875–1913, 
as suggested by our output-based estimates. Overall, we are able to rec-
oncile most of the existing time series and benchmark estimates of 
comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity in manufacturing before 
World War II.  
69 Williams, Made in Germany; Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness; and Landes, Un-
bound Prometheus.
70 Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity.” 
71 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum, p. 390; and Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate.” 
72 Ibid. 
73 Fremdling, “Productivity Comparison.”
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Appendix 1: Underlying Data for 1907 
Benchmark 
 General Note: individual figures in the tables have been rounded, whereas the calcu-









(£ per ton) 
Employment
(000)
Output Per Employee 
(£)
Sulphuric acid  475,000  861 1.81  
Anthracene  1,482  8 5.40  
Napthalene  12,750  33 2.59  
Pitch  537,000  684 1.27   
Total of above    1,586  
Total industry    24,025  52.257 459.75 
Germany 








Output Per Employee 
(M)
Sulphuric acid  1,150,524  41,159 35.77  
Anthracene  4,026  646 160.46  
Napthalene  36,397  2,714 74.57  
Pitch  402,676  12,986 32.25   
Total of above    57,505  
Total industry    123,478  9.830 12,561.34 
PPP
M per £ 
U.K. weights  22.03 
German weights  21.20
Geometric mean  21.61
Notes: Data were first obtained on the quantities and values of matched chemical outputs in both 
countries. A PPP was calculated from the unit values, taking care to convert British tons into 
German tonnes (1 ton = 1.016 tonnes), and taking the geometric mean of U.K. and German 
weights. The PPP was applied to the value of output per employee, since the German data on 
input values needed to calculate net output are incomplete. 
Comparing output per employee of M12,561.34 in Germany and £459.75 in the United King-
dom at a PPP of £1 = M21.61 yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 
126.6. German data are for 1908. 
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 571–73; Germany: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” pp. 59–63; and “Die Ergebnisse,” p. 108. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
COKE
  United Kingdom  Germany 
  Units  Values  Units  Values 
Output volume  000 tons  11,344  000 tonnes  22,723 
Output value   £000  9,516  M000  388,187 
Unit value  £ per ton  0.84  M per tonne  17.08 
Industry output value  £000  10,140  M000  464,507 
Industry employment  000  10.958  000  24.535 
Adjusted employment  000  10.284  000  20.504 
Output per employee  tons  1,103     
Output per employee  tonnes  1,121  tonnes  1,108 
Net output  £000  2,993  M000  125,747 
Net output per em-
ployee 
 £  273.13  M  5,125 
PPP      M per £  20.77 
Germany/U.K. net 
output per employee 
     U.K. = 100  90.4 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities and values of coke produced in the two countries. 
Employment was adjusted in line with the ratio of the value of the output of these principal 
products to the total value of output in the industry.  
 Comparing output per employee of 1,108 tonnes in Germany with 1,121 tonnes in the United 
Kingdom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 98.9. Finally, a cross-
check was carried out by comparing net output per employee in the two countries at the PPP ob-
tained from the unit values, including extra information on prices of tar and pitch as well as 
coke. The results using net output are reassuringly close to the results obtained with physical in-
dicators. German data are for 1908. 
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 69–70; Germany: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” pp. 4–5. 
336 Broadberry and Burhop
APPENDIX TABLE 3













Pig iron  6,988  23,482 3.36     
Cast iron  2,094  16,854 8.05     
Rails  1,085  7,257 6.69     
Plates and sheets  1,876  17,282 9.21     
Wire  513  4,083 7.96     
Total of above    68,958      
Total industry    105,322      













Pig iron  10,681  657,152 61.53     
Cast iron  2,416  481,851 199.45     
Rails  1,635  194,842 119.15     
Plates and sheets  1,426  216,055 151.56     
Wire  1,062  130,217 122.59     
Total of above    1,680,117      
Total industry    3,586,780      
Total industry (net)    970,900   315.895  3,073.48 
PPP
M per £ 
U.K. weights  19.64 
German weights  19.20
Geometric mean  19.42
Notes: Data were first obtained on the quantities and values of matched outputs in both coun-
tries. A PPP was calculated from the unit values, taking care to convert British tons into German 
tonnes, and taking the geometric mean of U.K. and German weights. The PPP was applied to 
net output per employee, available for both countries. 
 Comparing net output per employee of M3,073.48 in Germany and £114.83 in the United 
Kingdom at a PPP of £1 = M19.42 yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio 
of 137.8. German data are for 1908. 
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 171–75; Germany: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” pp. 46–50. 















Copper, unwrought  40,900  3,422  83.67     
Zinc, unrefined  38,000  918  24.16     
Total of above    4,340       
Total industry    26,270       













Copper, unwrought  16,568  20,926  1,263     
Zinc, unrefined  227,695  90,017  395     
Total of above    110,943       
Total industry    349,115       
Total industry (net)    74,268    22.952  3,236 
PPP
M per £ 
U.K. weights  13.95 
German weights  15.38
Geometric mean  14.65
Notes: Data were first obtained on the quantities and values of matched outputs in both coun-
tries. A PPP was calculated from the unit values, taking care to convert British tons into German 
tonnes, and taking the geometric mean of U.K. and German weights. The PPP was applied to 
net output per employee, available for both countries 
 Comparing net output per employee of M3,236 in Germany and £139.89 in the United King-
dom at a PPP of £1 = M14.65 yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 
157.9. German data are for 1908. 
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 264–66; Germany: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” p. 2. 













Motor vehicles  8,800  2,948  335     
Chassis  1,500  637  425     
Motor cycles  3,700  137  37     
Total of above    3,722       
Total industry    11,580       













Motor vehicles  7,318  47,841  6,537     
Chassis  2,126  20,139  9,472     
Motor cycles  3,703  2,247  607     
Total of above    70,227       
Total industry    73,000       
Total industry (net)    37,000    19.221  1,925 
PPP
M per £ 
U.K. weights  19.88 
German weights  19.45
Geometric mean  19.66
Notes: Data were first obtained on the quantities and values of matched outputs in both coun-
tries. A PPP was calculated from the unit values, taking care to convert British tons into German 
tonnes, and taking the geometric mean of U.K. and German weights. The PPP was applied to 
net output per employee, available for both countries 
 Comparing net output per employee of M1,925 in Germany and £109.19 in the United King-
dom at a PPP of £1 = M19.66 yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 
89.7. German data are for 1909. The estimate in Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Pro-
ductivity,” showing a substantial German labor productivity lead in this sector resulted from the 
use of too high a figure for U.K. employment. 
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 203–04; Germany: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” pp. 65, 67. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 6
COTTON
United Kingdom  Germany 
Units Values Units Values
Output volume  000 lb  1,487,367  000 kg  358,935 
Output value   £000  78,304  M000  644,464 
Unit value  £ per lb  0.05  M per kg  1.80 
Industry output value  £000  174,610  M000  644,464 
Industry employment  000  572.062  000  159.432 
Adjusted employment  000  256.542  000  159.432 
Output per employee  lb  5,798     
Output per employee  kg  2,630  kg  2,251 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities and values of yarn produced in the two countries. 
Employment was adjusted in line with the ratio of the value of this output to the total value of 
output in the industry.  
 Comparing output per employee of 2,251 kg in Germany with 2,630 kg in the United King-
dom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 85.6. German data are for 
1907.
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 337–39; Germany, output: Kaiser-
liches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jarhbuch, vol. 30, p. 80; “Berufs- und Betriebszählung,” 
pp. 253–54; Germany, employment: Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” p. 69. 
APPENDIX TABLE 7
SILK 
United Kingdom  Germany 
Units Values Units Values
Output volume  000 lb  2,711  000 kg  9,940 
Output value   £000  1,330  M000  337,745 
Unit value  £ per lb  0.49  M per kg  33.98 
Industry output value  £000  5,236  M000  337,745 
Industry employment  000  32.272  000  88.456 
Adjusted employment  000  8.197  000  88.456 
Output per employee  lb  331     
Output per employee  kg  150.0  kg  112.4 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities and values of the principal products in silk weav-
ing and silk spinning in the two countries. Employment was adjusted in line with the ratio of the 
value of the output of these principal products to the total value of output in the industry.  
 Comparing output per employee of 112.4 kg in Germany with 150.0 kg in the United King-
dom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 74.9. German data are for 
1907.
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 358–59; Germany, output: Kaiser-
liches Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” pp. 74–75; Germany, employment: Kaiserliches Sta-
tistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, vol. 30, p. 80; “Berufs- und Betriebszählung,” pp. 253–
54.
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APPENDIX TABLE 8
LEATHER
  United Kingdom  Germany 
  Units  Values  Units  Values 
Output volume  000 cwt  1,729  000 kg  137,272 
Output value   £000  11,080  M000  625,276 
Unit value  £ per cwt  6.41  M per kg  4.56 
Industry output value  £000  18,289  M000  675,320 
Industry employment  000  28.910  000  43.621 
Adjusted employment  000  17.515  000  40.389 
Output per employee  cwt  98.718     
Output per employee  kg  5,015  kg  3,399 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities and values of leather production in the two coun-
tries. Employment was adjusted in line with the ratio of the value of the output of the principal 
products to the total value of output in the industry.  
 Comparing output per employee of 3,399 kg in Germany with 5,015 kg in the United King-
dom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 67.8. In Broadberry and 
Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity,” U.K. output was underestimated. The current figures 
are to be preferred. German data are for 1910. 
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 675–76; Germany, output: Kaiser-
liches Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” p. 78; Germany, employment: Kaiserliches Statistisches 
Amt, “Ergebnisse,” p. 77; “Berufs- und Betriebszählung,” p. 256. 
APPENDIX TABLE 9
BREWING
  United Kingdom  Germany 
  Units  Values  Units  Values 
Output volume  000 barrels  34,505     
Output volume  m liters  5,647  m liters  7,371 
Output value  £000  58,580     
Industry output value  £000  67,250     
Industry employment  000  88.969  000  111.779 
Adjusted employment  000  77.499     
Output per employee  liters  72,866  liters  65,940 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities of beer brewed in the two countries and the vol-
ume of employment.  
 Comparing output per employee of 65,940 liters in Germany with 72,866 liters in the United 
Kingdom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 90.5. German data are 
for 1907. 
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 524–25; Germany: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, vol. 30, pp. 82, 103. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 10
TOBACCO
  United Kingdom  Germany 
  Units  Values  Units  Values 
Output volume  cwt  970,000     
Output volume  m kg  49,278  m kg  23,071 
Output value  £000  23,452     
Industry output value  £000  23,870     
Industry employment  000  37.648  000  61.162 
Adjusted employment  000  36.989     
Output per employee  kg  1,332  kg  377 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities of tobacco processed in the two countries and the 
volume of employment.  
 Comparing output per employee of 377 kg in Germany with 1,332 kg in the United Kingdom 
yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 28.3. German data are for 1907.  
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 538–39; Germany: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, vol. 30, p. 275. 
APPENDIX TABLE 11
SUGAR
  United Kingdom  Germany 
  Units  Values  Units  Values 
Output volume  000 cwt  11,300    
Output volume  000 kg  574,040  000 kg  2,138,731 
Output value  £000  8,995    
Industry output value  £000  12,315    
Industry employment  000  6.501  000  37.380 
Adjusted employment  000  4.748    
Output per employee  kg  120,901  kg  57,216 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities of sugar processed in the two countries and the 
volume of employment.  
 Comparing output per employee of 57,216 kg in Germany with 120,901 kg in the United 
Kingdom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 47.3. German data are 
for 1907.
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 521–22; Germany: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, vol. 30, pp. 82, 107. 
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CEMENT
  United Kingdom  Germany 
  Units  Values  Units  Values 
Output volume  000 tons  2,877  000 tonnes  5,867 
Output value   £000  3,439  M000  121,917 
Unit value  £ per ton  1.20  M per tonne  20.78 
Industry output value  £000  3,735  M000  126,846 
Industry employment  000  14.819  000  26.356 
Adjusted employment  000  13.645  000  25.332 
Output per employee  tons  211     
Output per employee  tonnes  214  tonnes  232 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities and values of cement produced in the two coun-
tries. Employment was adjusted in line with the ratio of the value of the output of the principal 
products to the total value of output in the industry.  
 Comparing output per employee of 232 tonnes in Germany with 214 tonnes in the United 
Kingdom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 108.1. German data 
are for 1910. Note that the earlier estimate of Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Produc-
tivity,” underestimated German employment, and hence exaggerated the German labor produc-
tivity leadership at 132.5. The lower figure reported here is to be preferred.  
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 775; Germany: Kaiserliches Sta-
tistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” p. 68. 
APPENDIX TABLE 13
SALT MINING
  United Kingdom  Germany 
  Units  Values  Units  Values 
Output volume  000 tons  1,278  000 tonnes  657 
Output value   £000  650  M000  19,667 
Unit value  £ per ton  0.51  M per tonne  29.92 
Industry output value  £000  667  M000  19,729 
Industry employment  000  4.736  000  4.052 
Adjusted employment  000  4.615  000  4.039 
Output per employee  tons  277     
Output per employee  tonnes  281  tonnes  163 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities and values of salt produced in the two countries at 
salt mines and brine pits and refined at salt works. Employment was adjusted in line with the ra-
tio of the value of the output of the principal products to the total value of output in the industry.  
 Comparing output per employee of 163 tonnes in Germany with 281 tonnes in the United 
Kingdom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 57.8. German data are 
for 1908.
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, p. 81; Germany: Kaiserliches Sta-
tistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” p. 42. 
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COAL MINING 
  United Kingdom  Germany 
  Units  Values  Units  Values 
Output volume  000 tons  266,588  000 tonnes  146,094 
Output value   £000  119,553  M000  1,577,174 
Unit value  £ per ton  0.45  M per tonne  10.80 
Industry output value  £000  122,637  M000  1,577,174 
Industry employment  000  838.586  000  562.034 
Adjusted employment  000  817.498  000  562.034 
Output per employee  tons  326    
Output per employee  tonnes  331  tonnes  260 
Net output  £000  106,090  M000  1,515,786 
Net output per employee  £  126.51  M  2,697 
PPP      M per £  23.69 
Germany/U.K. net  
output per employee 
     U.K. = 100  90.0 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities and values of coal mined in the two countries. 
Employment was adjusted in line with the ratio of the value of the output of the principal prod-
ucts to the total value of output in the industry.  
 Comparing output per employee of 260 tonnes in Germany with 331 tonnes in the United 
Kingdom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 78.5. German data are 
for 1908. A cross-check was carried out by comparing net output per employee in the two coun-
tries at the PPP obtained from the unit values. The results using net output are reassuringly close 
to the results obtained with physical indicators. 
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 66–67; Germany: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” p. 2. 
APPENDIX TABLE 15
IRON ORE MINING 
  United Kingdom  Germany 
  Units  Values  Units  Values 
Output volume  000 tons  8,184  000 tonnes  18,830 
Output value   £000  2,328  M000  84,275 
Unit value  £ per ton  0.28  M per tonne  4.48 
Industry output value  £000  122,637  M000  84,275 
Industry employment  000  838.586  000  39.594 
Adjusted employment  000  15.919  000  39.594 
Output per employee  tons  514     
Output per employee  tonnes  522  tonnes  476 
Notes: Data were first collected on quantities and values of iron ore mined in the two countries. 
Employment was adjusted in line with the ratio of the value of the output of the principal prod-
ucts to the total value of output in the industry.  
 Comparing output per employee of 476 tonnes in Germany with 522 tonnes in the United 
Kingdom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 91.0. German data are 
for 1908.
Sources: United Kingdom: Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 66–67; Germany: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, “Ergebnisse,” p. 2. 
344 Broadberry and Burhop
Appendix 2: Data For Time Series Projections 
APPENDIX TABLE 16
DATA FOR TIME SERIES PROJECTIONS 
(1913 = 100) 








1871  43.0  69.3  22.5  28.3  46.6 
1872  44.0  70.2  25.8  26.8  
1873  45.0  70.5  26.9  27.6  
1874  46.0  70.6  27.4  29.2  
1875  46.0  70.7  27.2  29.8  50.4 
1876  45.5  70.3  27.6  31.1  52.0 
1877  46.5  70.0  27.2  30.5  52.1 
1878  45.5  69.0  28.1  33.1  51.7 
1879  42.9  66.1  28.4  34.0  53.3 
1880  49.8  70.7  27.6  32.3  53.8 
1881  51.7  72.5  28.9  33.5  53.8 
1882  55.0  74.3  28.8  32.2  55.3 
1883  55.4  75.0  30.9  35.0  56.5 
1884  52.7  71.4  32.3  37.2  58.4 
1885  50.2  71.3  32.8  38.4  58.5 
1886  49.8  71.4  33.4  40.7  60.3 
1887  54.5  74.3  35.4  41.8  61.7 
1888  58.3  77.3  37.2  42.7  63.7 
1889  62.5  80.6  41.0  46.2  66.4 
1890  63.0  83.7  41.4  46.2  68.7 
1891  63.6  81.3  42.3  46.7  68.4 
1892  59.5  79.7  43.3  48.3  68.1 
1893  59.4  82.7  44.9  51.1  68.3 
1894  61.4  80.6  47.5  55.0  68.9 
1895  65.2  82.3  51.3  58.8  70.9 
1896  74.2  84.7  54.0  60.7  74.4 
1897  71.2  86.0  55.3  60.9  77.3 
1898  75.3  87.2  58.6  63.5  80.0 
1899  78.3  88.6  60.2  63.5  82.0 
1900  77.4  88.4  60.1  62.3  84.0 
1901  77.1  88.3  60.1  61.5  82.7 
1902  77.4  88.5  61.3  62.6  82.4 
1903  75.5  88.9  65.5  69.0  84.1 
1904  76.0  88.5  68.2  73.0  86.3 
1905  82.6  90.1  71.2  75.8  88.5 
1906  86.5  92.3  73.8  76.4  90.9 
1907  88.8  93.0  79.2  80.7  92.6 
1908  81.2  89.6  80.1  82.0  91.2 
1909  82.2  90.4  82.0  84.1  91.2 
1910  83.1  94.1  85.2  87.8  93.9 
1911  90.2  96.5  90.4  93.8  96.3 
1912  93.9  97.5  97.2  98.3  99.0 
1913  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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  U.K.  U.K.  German Output  German 
  Output  Employment  Hoffmann  RBW  Employment 
B. 1913–1938 
1913  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1914           
1915           
1916           
1917           
1918           
1919           
1920           
1921           
1922           
1923           
1924   92.9      
1925  111.8  93.4  104.7  90.6  109.3 
1926  108.2  90.8  106.2  81.9  96.2 
1927  119.6  96.6  120.3  105.6  111.5 
1928  119.4  96.5  121.6  107.5  114.6 
1929  124.2  97.8  123.6  106.5  110.6 
1930  118.9  91.0  109.3  88.7  99.9 
1931  110.8  84.9  91.5  70.4  85.3 
1932  111.4  86.2  79.7  61.6  72.8 
1933  119.6  89.4  87.8  71.5  77.5 
1934  130.6  93.5  105.8  88.0  90.6 
1935  142.4  95.8  126.5  102.9  99.2 
1936  155.7  101.1  139.6  114.2  107.0 
1937  165.1  106.2  151.2  127.0  115.7 
1938  160.2  104.6  168.5  140.4  122.1 
Sources: United Kingdom: output and employment from Broadberry, Productivity Race, pp. 42–
44, based on Feinstein, National Income; Germany: Hoffmann output and employment for 
manufacturing only from Broadberry, Productivity Race, pp. 42–44, based on Hoffmann, Das 
Wachstum; RBW output from Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate,” and Ritschl, “Spuri-
ous Growth,” p. 216, col. 4.  
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Manufacturing
APPENDIX TABLE 17
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING 
(United Kingdom = 100) 
  Broadberry  Burhop-Wolff-Ritschl  Burhop-Wolff-Hoffmann 
A. 1871–1913 
1871 93.7  170.6  127.2
1872     
1873     
1874     
1875 99.9  168.4  125.5
1876 98.5  166.5  124.1
1877 94.6  157.2  117.1
1878 99.1  164.0  122.2
1879 99.1  165.4  123.2
1880 87.6  143.6  107.0
1881 90.8  147.7  110.1
1882 84.6  138.2  103.0
1883 89.1  145.4  108.3
1884 90.2  147.5  109.9
1885 95.8  154.2  114.9
1886 95.6  153.6  114.5
1887 93.9  149.5  111.4
1888 93.3  147.4  109.9
1889 96.1  150.7  112.3
1890 96.4  149.1  111.1
1891 95.2  147.6  110.0
1892  102.4  159.7  119.0
1893  110.2  169.2  126.1
1894  108.9  168.6  125.6
1895  109.9  174.3  129.9
1896 99.8  153.6  114.5
1897  104.0  157.6  117.4
1898  102.1  153.9  114.7
1899  100.2  148.1  110.3
1900 98.4  141.7  105.6
1901  100.0  144.9  107.9
1902  102.4  148.1  110.3
1903  110.5  161.0  120.0
1904  110.8  157.9  117.7
1905  105.7  149.1  111.1
1906  104.3  145.0  108.0
1907  107.8  151.5  112.9
1908  116.7  163.0  121.5
1909  119.0  166.7  124.2
1910  123.7  169.7  126.4
1911  120.8  165.2  123.1
1912  122.6  166.9  124.4
1913  120.4  161.6  120.4
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  Broadberry  Burhop-Wolff-Ritschl  Burhop-Wolff-Hoffmann 
B. 1925–1938 
1925 96.4    96.4
1926  111.5  108.9  111.5
1927  104.8  119.0  104.8
1928  103.3  118.0  103.3
1929  106.0  116.9  106.0
1930  100.8  103.0  100.8
1931 99.0  96.0  99.0
1932  102.0  99.1  102.0
1933  101.9  104.2  101.9
1934  100.7  104.9  100.7
1935  103.2  103.2  103.2
1936  102.0  102.0  102.0
1937  101.2  104.1  101.2
1938  108.4  111.2  108.4
Sources: See Appendix 2; and authors’ own calculations.    
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